# 1NC

## 1

#### Obama’s strong -- leverage makes GOP obstructionism on immigration unsustainable

Jeff Mason, Reuters, 10/19/13, Analysis: Despite budget win, Obama has weak hand with Congress , health.yahoo.net/news/s/nm/analysis-despite-budget-win-obama-has-weak-hand-with-congress

Democrats believe, however, that Obama's bargaining hand may be strengthened by the thrashing Republicans took in opinion polls over their handling of the shutdown.

"This shutdown re-emphasized the overwhelming public demand for compromise and negotiation. And that may open up a window," said Ben LaBolt, Obama's 2012 campaign spokesman and a former White House aide.

"There's no doubt that some Republican members (of Congress) are going to oppose policies just because the president's for it. But the hand of those members was significantly weakened."

If he does have an upper hand, Obama is likely to apply it to immigration reform. The White House had hoped to have a bill concluded by the end of the summer. A Senate version passed with bipartisan support earlier this year but has languished in the Republican-controlled House.

"It will be hard to move anything forward, unless the Republicans find the political pain of obstructionism too much to bear," said Doug Hattaway, a Democratic strategist and an adviser to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign.

"That may be the case with immigration - they'll face pressure from business and Latinos to advance immigration reform," he said.

#### Plan drains capital—anti-Cuba lobby means any policy draws a fight

Birns and Mills 13 (Larry, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Frederick B., COHA Senior Research Fellow, 01/30, “Best Time for U.S.–Cuba Rapprochement Is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/)

Despite the basic intransigence of US policy towards Cuba, in recent years, important changes have been introduced by Havana: state control over the economy has been diminished; most travel restrictions affecting both Americans and Cubans on the island have been lifted; and the “group of 75” Cuban dissidents detained in 2003 have been freed. Washington has all but ignored these positive changes by Havana, but when it comes to interacting with old foes such as those of Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia, somehow constructive dialogue is the order of the day. One reason for this inconsistency is the continued opposition by the anti-Castro lobby to a change of course by Washington. The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue to see the embargo as a tool for coercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change. It is true that the reformist tendency in Cuba does not include a qualitative move from a one party system to political pluralism. Lamentably, Cuba reportedly continues to use temporary detentions and the occasional jailing of non-violent dissidents to limit the parameters of political debate and total freedom of association. The authors agree that no non-violent Cuban dissident should be intimidated, detained or jailed. But continuing to maliciously turn the screws on Havana has never provided an incentive for more democracy in any sense of the word nor has it created a political opening into which Cuba, with confidence, could enter. The easing of tensions between Washington and Havana is more likely to contribute to the evolution of a more democratic form of socialism on the island, the early stages of which we may presently be witnessing. In any case the precise form of such change inevitably should and will be decided in Cuba, not in Washington or Miami. To further moves towards rapprochement with Cuba, the U.S. State Department should remove the country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It is an invention to depict Havana as a state sponsor of terrorism, a charge only levied by the State Department under pressure from Hill hardliners. As researcher Kevin Edmunds, quite properly points out: “This position is highly problematic, as the United States has actively engaged in over 50 years of economic and covert destabilization in Cuba, going so far as blindly protecting wanted terrorists such as Luis Posada Carilles and Orlando Bosch, both former CIA agents accused of dozens of terrorist attacks in Cuba and the United States ” (Nov. 15, 2012, Kevin Edmonds blog). It was precisely the propensity of some anti-Castro extremists to plan terrorist attacks against Cuba that urgently motivated the infiltration of such groups by the Cuban five as well as the close monitoring of these organizations by the FBI. Another gesture of good will would be for the White House to grant clemency to the Cuban five: Gerardo Hernandez, Ramón Labañino, Fernando Gonzalez, Antonio Guerrero and René Gonzalez. They are Cuban nationals who were convicted in a Miami court in 2001 and subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from 15 years to double life, mostly on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Despite requests for a change of venue out of Miami, which at first was granted and later denied, the trial took place in a politically charged Miami atmosphere that arguably tainted the proceedings and compromised justice. Supporters maintain that the Cuban five had infiltrated extremist anti-Castro organizations in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Cuba and did not pose any security threat to the United States. It would be an important humanitarian gesture to let them go home. Perhaps such a gesture might facilitate reciprocity on the part of Cuban authorities when it comes to American engineer Alan Gross who is presently being detained in a Cuban jail. There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obama administration for taking steps towards reconciliation with Havana, but if Obama’s election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on the island. The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act, however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign Relations Committee, and her counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who is about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures advocated here as a capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued, a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, but might in fact be advanced by détente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history may very well be that it ought never to have been started.

#### Obama’s capital key – Boehner

Bill Scher, The Week, 10/18/13, How to make John Boehner cave on immigration , theweek.com/article/index/251361/how-to-make-john-boehner-cave-on-immigration

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) generally adheres to the unwritten Republican rule that bars him from allowing votes on bills opposed by a majority of Republicans, even if they would win a majority of the full House.

But he's caved four times this year, allowing big bills to pass with mainly Democratic support. They include repealing the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans; providing Hurricane Sandy relief; expanding the Violence Against Women act to better cover immigrants, Native Americans, and LGBT survivors of abuse; and this week's bill raising the debt limit and reopening the federal government.

Many presume the Republican House is a black hole sucking President Obama's second-term agenda into oblivion. But the list of Boehner's past retreats offers a glimmer of hope, especially to advocates of immigration reform. Though it has languished in the House, an immigration overhaul passed with bipartisan support in the Senate, and was given a fresh push by Obama in the aftermath of the debt limit deal.

The big mystery that immigration advocates need to figure out: What makes Boehner cave? Is there a common thread? Is there a sequence of buttons you can push that forces Boehner to relent?

Two of this year's caves happened when Boehner was backed up against hard deadlines: The Jan. 1 fiscal cliff and the Oct. 17 debt limit. Failure to concede meant immediate disaster. Reject the bipartisan compromise on rolling back the Bush tax cuts, get blamed for jacking up taxes on every taxpayer. Reject the Senate's three-month suspension of the debt limit, get blamed for sparking a global depression. Boehner held out until the absolute last minute both times, but he was not willing to risk blowing the deadline.

A third involved the response to an emergency: Hurricane Sandy. Conservative groups were determined to block disaster relief because — as with other federal disaster responses — the $51 billion legislative aid package did not include offsetting spending cuts. Lacking Republican votes, Boehner briefly withdrew the bill from consideration, unleashing fury from New York and New Jersey Republicans, including Gov. Chris Christie. While there wasn't a hard deadline to meet, disaster relief was a time-sensitive matter, and the pressure from Christie and his allies was unrelenting. Two weeks after pulling the bill, Boehner put it on the floor, allowing it to pass over the objections of 179 Republicans.

The fourth cave occurred in order to further reform and expand a government program: The Violence Against Women Act. The prior version of the law had been expired for over a year, as conservatives in the House resisted the Senate bill in the run-up to the 2012 election. But after Mitt Romney suffered an 18-point gender gap in his loss to Obama, and after the new Senate passed its version again with a strong bipartisan vote, Boehner was unwilling to resist any longer. Two weeks later, the House passed the Senate bill with 138 Republicans opposed.

Unfortunately for immigration advocates, there is no prospect of widespread pain if reform isn't passed. There is no immediate emergency, nor threat of economic collapse.

But there is a deadline of sorts: The 2014 midterm elections.

If we've learned anything about Boehner this month, it's that he's a party man to the bone. He dragged out the shutdown and debt limit drama for weeks, without gaining a single concession, simply so his most unruly and revolutionary-minded members would believe he fought the good fight and stay in the Republican family. What he won is party unity, at least for the time being.

What Boehner lost for his Republicans is national respectability. Republican Party approval hit a record low in both the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll and Gallup poll.

Here's where immigration advocates have a window of opportunity to appeal to Boehner's party pragmatism. Their pitch: The best way to put this disaster behind them is for Republicans to score a big political victory. You need this.

A year after the Republican brand was so bloodied that the Republican National Committee had to commission a formal "autopsy," party approval is the worst it has ever been. You've wasted a year. Now is the time to do something that some voters will actually like.

There's reason to hope he could be swayed. In each of the four cases in which he allowed Democrats to carry the day, he put the short-term political needs of the Republican Party over the ideological demands of right-wing activists.

Boehner will have to do another round of kabuki. He can't simply swallow the Senate bill in a day. There will have to be a House version that falls short of activists' expectations, followed by tense House-Senate negotiations. Probably like in the most formulaic of movies, and like the fiscal cliff and debt limit deals, there will have to be an "all-is-lost moment" right before we get to the glorious ending. Boehner will need to given the room to do all this again.

But he won't do it without a push. A real good push.

#### Critical to US economic recovery

Aaron Terrazas, Migration Policy Institute, July 2011, The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EconomicIntegration.pdf

The fate of immigrants in the United States and their integration into the labor market are impossible to separate from the state of the overall US economy and the fate of all US workers. During periods of economic expansion and relative prosperity, upward economic mobility among the native born generates opportunities for immigrants to gain a foothold in the US labor market and to gradually improve their status over time. In many respects, a growing economy during the 1990s and early 2000s provided ample opportunity for immigrants — and especially their children — to gradually improve their status over time. However, the story of immigrants’ integration into the US labor force during the years leading to the recession was also mixed: In general, the foreign born had high labor force participation, but they were also more likely to occupy low-paying jobs. The most notable advances toward economic integration occur over generations, due in large part to the openness of US educational institutions to the children of immigrants and the historic lack of employment discrimination against workers with an immigrant background. In the wake of the global economic crisis, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of the US economy and labor market. Most forecasts suggest that the next decade will be substantially different from the past26 and it is not clear if previous trends in immigrants’ economic integration will continue. The recession, weak recovery, and prospect of prolonged stagnation as a result of continuing high public debt, could realign the economic and social forces that have historically propelled the the less-educated labor force have been dismal for decades. In some respects, the recession accelerated these trends. While the prospect of greater demand for US manufactured goods from emerging markets might slow gradual decay of the US manufacturing industry, the outlook for the industry remains weak. Steady educational gains throughout the developing world have simultaneously increased downward wage pressure on highly skilled workers who, in the past, generated substantial secondary demand for services that immigrants often provide.

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows ‘9

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating** **crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## 2

**Hardline against Cuba now – terror list**

**Kasperowicz ’13** – Pete, Staff Writer for the Hill, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list”, 5/30, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements

As expected, the State Department on Thursday released a report that keeps Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, even as it acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving.

State's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012 was widely expected to keep Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, despite some reports that incorrectly suggested that it might be used by Secretary of State John Kerry to shift policy on Cuba.

In the case of Cuba, State listed three primary reasons for keeping the island nation on the list. First, it noted that Cuba continued to provide a safe haven for about two dozens members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a group charged with terrorism in Spain.

State's report, though, seemed to give Cuba some credit for hosting peace talks between the government of Colombia and members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The report notes that Cuba offered aid to FARC members "in past years," and indicates that Havana is no longer supporting the rebel group.

A second major reason for listing Cuba was that the government "continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United States." That language is unchanged from last year's report.

And thirdly, State said Cuba has deficiencies in the area of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, just as it did in last year’s report. This year, however, State also noted that Cuba has become a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America, which requires Havana to adopt anti-money laundering recommendations.

But still, this improvement and the hosting of peace talks between FARC and Colombia were not enough to remove Cuba from the list.

#### Lifting the embargo is appeasement – emboldens adversaries and turns case

Brookes ‘9 – Peter, Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “KEEP THE EMBARGO, O”, April 15, <http://nypost.com/2009/04/15/keep-the-embargo-o/>

IN another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba.

Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance.

Sure, it’s fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years — even though Cubanos aren’t allowed to visit America.

And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty — even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.

In the end, though, it’s still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who’ll decide whether there’ll be a thaw in ties with the United States — or not.

And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.

Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) — without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime’s hard-line policies.

So much for the theory that if we’re nice to them, they’ll be nice to us.

Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with — without any concessions on Cuba’s part, of course.

Lifting the embargo won’t normalize relations, but instead legitimize — and wave the white flag to — Fidel’s 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.

Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers — allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.

The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that’ll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.

The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties — no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.

Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won’t live in.

We also don’t need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean — or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)

With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.

The embargo has stifled Havana’s ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.

Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn’t free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.

The US embargo remains a matter of principle — and an appropriate response to Cuba’s brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven’t we learned that yet?

Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

**Appeasement kills credibility – shows other countries the US is weak**

**Weissberg ’10** – Robert, Professor of Political Science-Emeritus, University of Illinois-Urbana, “President Obama's Compulsive Appeasement Disorder”, 9/27, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/president\_obamas\_compulsive\_ap.html

There's a simple explanation: we are no longer feared. Superpowers of yesteryear, going back to the Greeks and Romans, were feared for a reason -- they leveled a city to make an example. Today, by contrast, Uncle Sam relies on cajoling, bribery (think North Korea), entreating puny leaders of inchoate states (special envoys to the PLO's Mahmoud Abbas) and otherwise **playing weak hands**. We have gone from resolve to U.N. resolution. We've forgotten Machiavelli's sage advice: since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.

Being feared does not require bombing Iran into the Stone Age, though that would certainly terrify North Korea and even slow down the Somali pirates. Being feared is when your enemy believes that you are willing to use overwhelming, deadly force, and this need not require nuking anybody. **The trick is creating a credible, threatening persona** -- convincing your enemy that while you may speak softly, you also carry a big stick and are willing to use it. Israel long ago learned this lesson, regardless of world outrage.

**Obama’s credibility is uniquely key to solve conflict – prevents Indo-Pak war**

**Coes ’11** – Ben, former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002, “The disease of a weak president”, 9/30, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The attention of the world has been riveted to Israel, Palestine and Iran in light of the Palestinians’ decision to seek U.N. recognition and Ahmadinejad’s visit to New York City to once again rub America’s nose in his war-mongering, Holocaust denials and 9/11 conspiracy theories.

Unfortunately, President Obama’s weakness in his response to Israel and Iran is a cause for real concern, not only for our Israeli allies, but for other American allies as well. **A weak U.S. president emboldens our enemies**. A good example of this is what happened the last time we had a weak president, namely Jimmy Carter.

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.

In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.

But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.

If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.

Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:

First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.

Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.

Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.

In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.

I wish it was that simple.

The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.

There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. **The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president.** It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

**Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction – no checks**

**Chaffin ’11 – Greg, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia”, July 8, http://fpif.org/reorienting\_us\_security\_strategy\_in\_south\_asia/**

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war.

Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal.

A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place **the survival of the human race in jeopardy.** In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million.

The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.

Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.

## 3

#### Oil balanced slightly above $100 now, but it’s tenuous – market shift causes price decrease

Sampson 9/26 (Pamela, AP Business Writer, “Oil Dips Below $103 as Diplomacy on Syria Advances”, ABC News, 9/26/13, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/oil-price-hangs-month-low-20379334>)

Oil prices fell Friday, a day after the U.N. Security Council made progress in the quest to get Syria to relinquish its chemical weapons.¶ Benchmark oil for November delivery fell 57 cents to $102.46 per barrel at late afternoon Bangkok time in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange.¶ The council's five permanent members on Thursday agreed to a resolution calling for Syria to get rid of its chemical weapons. That helped ease fears of an escalation in Syria's civil war since the U.S. has been threatening to attack Syria in retaliation for what Washington says was a chemical gas attack by forces loyal to President Bashar Assad against civilians in suburban Damascus.¶ The prospect of an attack, and the potential for a disruption in oil supply routes, caused oil prices to spike in recent weeks. Prices have gradually fallen in recent days as diplomacy over Syria advanced. The progress at the U.N. on Thursday maintained the downward trend on the price of oil, said Ken Hasegawa, energy analyst at Newedge Brokerage in Tokyo.¶ Upbeat news about the U.S. economy pushed prices higher Thursday. The contract for benchmark crude gained 37 cents Thursday to close at $103.03 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Oil had dropped $5.41, or 5 percent, over the five previous trading sessions.¶ Oil prices rose as data showed that the number of Americans seeking unemployment benefits fell 5,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted 305,000, the second-lowest level in six years. The U.S. economy, meanwhile, was confirmed to have grown an annualized 2.5 percent in the April-June period.¶ Brent crude, the benchmark for international crudes used by many U.S. refineries, fell 33 cents to $108.88 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange in London.

#### Plan solves oil dependence—cooperation with Cuba makes other producers irrelevant—guarantees lower prices

Pinon 11 – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964\_Hemisphere\_Vol.\_20.pdf

If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, significant revenues from **oil**, natural gas and sugarcane ethanol **would integrate Cuba into** global and regional markets **within the next five years.**¶ International oil companies such as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras are actively exploring Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited United States oil companies to participate in developing the island’s offshore oil and natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this.¶ Although US oil, oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines.¶ Cuba currently **relies on heavily subsidized oil from Venezuela** for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply **contributes to the Cuban government’s ability to maintain a** politically antagonistic and belligerent position **towards the US**.¶ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. **Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon resources**, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves.¶ US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster.¶ To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill.¶ The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response.¶ The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill.¶ Cuba’s long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the island’s environment. **The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.**

#### Russia is on the brink—$100 key to prevent complete collapse

**Whitmore 13** (Brian, Senior Correspondent in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom, covering ... security, energy and military issues and domestic developments in Russia, “After The Storm: Trends To Watch In Russia In 2013”, January 02, 2013, The Power Vertical)

It began with a roar and it ended with a whimper. As 2012 wound down in Russia, the soaring expectations for change that accompanied the civic awakening and mass protests at the year’s dawn had clearly faded. But the social, economic, and political forces that spawned them will continue to shape the landscape well into the new year. A fledgling middle class remains hungry for political change, splits still plague the ruling elite over the way forward, and a fractious opposition movement continues to struggle to find its voice. With the Kremlin unable to decisively squelch the mounting dissent and the opposition unable to topple President Vladimir Putin, Russia has entered an uneasy holding pattern that has the feel of an interlude between two epochs. "I don't think we are at the end of the Putin era, but we are at the beginning of the end," says longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, international editor of the British weekly "The Economist" and author of the recently published book "Deception." With economic headwinds on the horizon, generational conflict brewing, and new political forces developing, Russian society is changing -- and changing rapidly. But the political system remains ossified. So what can we expect in 2013? Below are several trends and issues to keep an eye on in the coming year. The Oil Curse: Energy Prices And The Creaking Welfare State If 2012 was all about politics, 2013 will also be about economics. The Russian economy, the cliche goes, rests on two pillars -- oil and gas. And both will come under increasing pressure as the year unfolds. World oil prices, currently hovering between $90 and $100 per barrel, are expected to be volatile for the foreseeable future. And any sharp drop could prove catastrophic for the Russian economy. Energy experts and economists say Russia's budget will only stay balanced if oil prices remain between $100 and $110 per barrel. Five years ago, the figure needed for a balanced budget was $50 to $55.

#### Extinction

**Oliker 2** (Olga and Tanya Charlick-Paley, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, Assessing Russia’s Decline – Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air Force, RAND)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of de- cline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and sepa- rately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particu- larly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions com- bined with the politicization of regional economic and military inter- ests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at pre- sent, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to unite a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general de- terioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises se- rious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: • Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russian troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. • Border clashes with China in the **Russian Far East** or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. • Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. • Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. • A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. • A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. • Ethnic pogroms in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Illustrative Scenarios • Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. • A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. • An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. • Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unautho- rized diversion could foster the **proliferation** of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war. This list is far from exhaustive. However significant these scenarios may be, not all are relevant to U.S. military planning. We therefore applied several criteria to the larger portfolio of potential scenarios, with an eye to identifying the most useful for a more detailed discus- sion. First, only those scenarios that involve a reasonable threat to U.S. strategic interests were considered. Second, while it is impor- tant to plan for the unexpected, it is equally crucial to understand the likelihood of various events. We thus included a range of probabili- ties but eliminated those that we considered least plausible. Third, we only chose scenarios for which the Western response would likely be military or would rely on considerable military involvement. Lastly, we wanted to select a variety of situations, ones that created differing imperatives for the U.S. government and its Air Force, rather than scenarios, which, while equal in significance, present fairly similar problems. We therefore offer the following four story- lines as illustrative, if far from exhaustive, of the types of challenges that would be presented by operations on or near Russian territory.

## 4

**Security is a psychological construct—the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other**

**Mack ‘91**

Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such **self-destroying behavior**. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that **we have real choices**. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but **my enemy is real**. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and **one's own contribution to that threat**-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how **we have created that enemy**, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with **anything approaching objectivity**".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to **think critically** about how **our assigned enemies are selected for us.** In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "**War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy**."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that **impel individuals to kill or allow killing** in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to **participate in acts of violence** they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

**Their paranoid projections guarantee extinction—it’s try or die**

**Hollander ‘3**

Professor of Latin American history and women's studies at California State University (Nancy, "A Psychoanalytic Perspective on the Politics of Terror: In the Aftermath of 9/11" [www.estadosgerais.org/mundial\_rj/download/FLeitor\_NHollander\_ingl.pdf](http://www.estadosgerais.org/mundial_rj/download/FLeitor_NHollander_ingl.pdf))

In this sense, then, 9-11 has symbolically constituted a relief in the sense of a decrease in the persecutory anxiety provoked by living in a culture undergoing a deterioration from within. The implosion reflects the economic and social trends I described briefly above and has been manifest in many related symptoms, including the erosion of family and community, the corruption of government in league with the wealthy and powerful, the abandonment of working people by profit-driven corporations going international, urban plight, a drug-addicted youth, a violence addicted media reflecting and motivating an escalating real-world violence, the corrosion of civic participation by a decadent democracy, a spiritually bereft culture held prisoner to the almighty consumer ethic, racial discrimination, misogyny, gaybashing, growing numbers of families joining the homeless, and environmental devastation. Was this not lived as a kind of societal suicide--an ongoing assault, an aggressive attack—against life and emotional well-being waged from within against the societal self? In this sense, 9/11 permitted a respite from the sense of internal decay by inadvertently stimulating a renewed vitality via a reconfiguration of political and psychological forces: tensions within this country—between the “haves-mores” and “have-lesses,” as well as between the defenders and critics of the status quo, yielded to a wave of nationalism in which a united people--Americans all--stood as one against external aggression. At the same time, the generosity, solidarity and selfsacrifice expressed by Americans toward one another reaffirmed our sense of ourselves as capable of achieving the “positive” depressive position sentiments of love and empathy. Fractured social relations were symbolically repaired. The enemy- -the threat to our integrity as a nation and, in D. W. Winnicott’s terms, to our sense of going on being--was no longer the web of complex internal forces so difficult to understand and change, but a simple and identifiable enemy from outside of us, clearly marked by their difference, their foreignness and their uncanny and unfathomable “uncivilized” pre-modern character. The societal relief came with the projection of aggressive impulses onto an easily dehumanized external enemy, where they could be justifiably attacked and destroyed. This country’s response to 9/11, then, in part demonstrates how persecutory anxiety is more easily dealt with in individuals and in groups when it is experienced as being provoked from the outside rather than from internal sources. As Hanna Segal9 has argued (IJP, 1987), groups often tend to be narcissistic, self-idealizing, and paranoid in relation to other groups and to shield themselves from knowledge about the reality of **their own aggression**, which of necessity is projected into an enemy-- real or **imagined**--so that it can be demeaned, held in contempt and then attacked. In this regard, 9/11 permitted a new discourse to arise about what is fundamentally wrong in the world: indeed, the anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies of the U.S. government functioned for a period to overshadow the anti-globalization movement that has identified the fundamental global conflict to be between on the one hand the U.S. and other governments in the First World, transnational corporations, and powerful international financial institutions, and on the other, workers’ struggles, human rights organizations and environmental movements throughout the world. The new discourse presents the fundamental conflict in the world as one between civilization and fundamentalist terrorism. But **this “civilization” is a wolf in sheep’s clothing**, and those who claim to represent it reveal the kind of splitting Segal describes: a hyperbolic idealization of themselves and their culture and a projection of all that is bad, including the consequences of the terrorist underbelly of decades long U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Asia, **onto the denigrated other, who must be annihilated**. The U.S. government, tainted for years by its ties to powerful transnational corporate interests, has recreated itself as the nationalistic defender of the American people. In the process, patriotism has kidnapped citizens’ grief and mourning and militarism has high jacked people’s fears and anxieties, converting them into a passive consensus for an increasingly authoritarian government’s domestic and foreign policies. The defensive significance of this new discourse has to do with another theme related to death anxiety as well: the threat of **species annihilation** that people have lived with since the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Segal argues that the leaders of the U.S. as well as other countries with nuclear capabilities, have disavowed their own aggressive motivations as they developed10 weapons of mass destruction. The distortion of language throughout the Cold War, such as “deterrence,” “flexible response,” Mutual Assured Destruction”, “rational nuclear war,” “Strategic Defense Initiative” has served to deny the aggressive nature of the arms race (p. 8) and “to disguise from ourselves and others **the horror of a nuclear war and our own part in making it possible or more likely**” (pp. 8-9). Although the policy makers’ destructiveness can be hidden from their respective populations and justified for “national security” reasons, Segal believes that such denial only increases reliance on projective mechanisms and stimulates paranoia.

**Vote negative to interrogate cycles of enemy creation—this can create a fissure in dominant narratives that make war inevitable**

**Byles ‘3**

English, U Cyprus (Joanna, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification, <http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/articles/art_byles01.shtml>)

It is here of course that language plays an important role in imagining the other, the other within the self, and the other as self, as well as the enormously influential visual images each group can have of the other. In the need to emphasize similarity in difference, both verbal and visual metaphor can play a meaningful role in creating a climate for peaceful understanding, and this is where literature, especially the social world of the drama and of film, but also the more private world of poetry, can be immensely significant. Of course not all literature is equally transparent. In conclusion, war, in all its manifestations, is a phenomenon put into action by individuals who have been politicized as a group to give and receive violent death, to appropriate the enemy's land, homes, women, children, and goods, and perhaps to lose their own. As we have seen, in wartime the splitting of the self and other into friend and enemy enormously relieves the normal psychic tension caused by human ambivalence when love and hate find two separate objects of attention. Hence the .soldier's and terrorist's willingness to sacrifice her/his life for "a just cause," which may be a Nation, a Group, or a Leader with whom he has close emotional ties and identity. I n this way s/he does not feel guilty: the destructive impulses, mobilised by her/his own superego, together with that of the social superego, have projected the guilt s/he might feel at killing strangers onto the enemy. In other words, the charging of the enemy with guilt by which the superego of the State mobilizes the individual's superego seems to be of fundamental importance in escaping the sense of guilt which war provokes in those engaged in the killing; yet the mobilization of superego activities can still involve the individual's self-punitive mechanisms, even though most of his/her guilt has been projected onto the enemy in the name of his own civilization and culture. As we all know, this guilt can become a problem at the end of a war, leading to varying degrees of misery and mental illness. For some, the killing of an enemy and a stranger cannot be truly mourned, and there remains a blank space, an irretrievable act or event to be lived through over and over again. This dilemma is poignantly expressed in Wilfred Owen's World War One poem "Strange Meeting" the final lines of which read as follows: I am the enemy you killed, my friend. I knew you in this dark: for so you frowned Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed. I parried; but my hands were loath and cold. Let us sleep now. ... (Owen 126) The problem for us today is how to **create the psychological** climate of opinion, a **mentality, that will reject war**, genocide, and terrorism as viable solutions to internal and external situations of conflict; to **recognize our projections** for what they are: **dangerously irresponsible psychic acts** based on superego hatred and **violence**. We must **challenge the way** in which the State superego can **manipulate our responses** in its own interests, even take away our subjectivities. We should acknowledge and learn to displace the violence in ourselves in socially harmless ways, getting rid of our fears and anxieties of the other and of difference by relating and identifying with the other and thus creating the serious desire to live together in a peaceful world. What seems to be needed is for the superego to regain its developmental role of mitigating omniscient protective identification by ensuring an intact, integrated object world, a world that will be able to contain unconscious fears, hatred, and anxieties without the need for splitting and projection. As Bion has pointed out, omnipotence replaces thinking and omniscience replaces learning. We must learn to link our internal and external worlds so as to act as a container of the other's fears and anxieties, and thus in turn to encourage the other to reciprocate as a container of our hatreds and fears. If war represents cultural formations that in turn represent objectifications of the psyche via the super-ego of the individual and of the State, then perhaps we can **reformulate** these psychic social mechanisms of projection and superego aggression. Here, that old peace-time ego and the reparative component of the individual and State superego will have to play a large part. The greater the clash of cultural formations for example, Western Modernism and Islamic Fundamentalism the more urgent the need. "The knowledge now most worth having" is an authentic way of internalizing what it is we understand about war and international terrorism that will liberate us from the history of our collective traumatic past and the imperatives it has imposed on us. The inner psychic world of the individual has an enormously important adaptive role to play here in developing mechanisms of protective identification not as a means of damaging and destroying the other, but as a means of empathy, of containing the other, and in turn being contained. These changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual ratherthan speedy. Peace and dare I say it contentment are not just an absence of war, but a state of mind. Furthermore, we should learn not to project too much into our group, and our nation, for this allows the group to tyrannize us, so that **we follow like lost sheep**. But speaking our minds takes courage because groups do not like open dissenters. These radical psychic changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than speedy; however, my proposition that understanding the other so that we can reduce her/his motivation to kill requires urgent action. **Peace is not just an absence of war, but a state of mind and**, most importantly, **a way of thinking**.

## Trade

#### Trade bad—

#### a) Causes war

Friedman and Friedman, ‘96 [George and Meredith, Founder and Chairman of Stratfor, The Future of War, p. 7-9]

The argument that interdependence gives rise to peace is flawed in theory as well as in practice. Conflicts arise from friction, particularly friction involving the fundamental interests of different nations. The less interdependence there is, the fewer the areas of serious friction. The more interdependence there is, the greater the areas of friction, and, therefore, the greater the potential for conflict. Two widely separated nations that trade little with each other are unlikely to go to war—Brazil is unlikely to fight Madagascar precisely because they have so little to do with each other. France and Germany, on the other hand, which have engaged in extensive trade and transnational finance, have fought three wars with each other over about seventy years. Interdependence was the root of the conflicts, not the deterrent. There are, of course, cases of interdependence in which one country effectively absorbs the other or in which their interests match so precisely that the two countries simply merge. In other cases, interdependence remains peaceful because the economic, military, and political power of one country is overwhelming and inevitable. In relations between advanced industrialized countries and third-world countries, for example, this sort of asymmetrical relationship can frequently be seen. All such relationships have a quality of unease built into them, particularly when the level of interdependence is great. When one or both nations attempt, intentionally or unintentionally, to shift the balance of power, the result is often tremendous anxiety and, sometimes, real pain. Each side sees the other’s actions as an attempt to gain advantage and becomes frightened. In the end, precisely because the level of interdependence is so great, the relationship can, and frequently does, spiral out of control. Consider the seemingly miraculous ability of the United States and Soviet Union to be rivals and yet avoid open warfare. These two powers could forgo extreme measures because they were not interdependent. Neither relied on the other for its economic well-being, and therefore, its social stability. This provided considerable room for maneuvering. Because there were few economic linkages, neither nation felt irresistible pressure to bring the relationship under control; neither felt any time constraint. Had one country been dependent on the other for something as important as oil or long-term investment, there would have been enormous fear of being held hostage economically. Each would have sought to dominate the relationship, and the result would have been catastrophic. In the years before World War I, as a result of European interdependence, control of key national issues fell into the hands of foreign governments. Thus, decisions made in Paris had tremendous impact on Austria, and decisions made in London determined growth rates in the Ruhr. Each government sought to take charge of its own destiny by shift­ing the pattern of interdependence in its favor. Where economic means proved insufficient, political and military strategies were tried. The international system following the Cold War resembles the pre—World War I system in some fundamental ways. First, there is a gen­eral prosperity. That is to say, the international economic system appears to be functioning extremely well, in spite of the normal cyclical down­turns of the early 1990s. Second, almost no fundamental ideological issues divide the major powers; one could say there is general agreement on matters of political principle. Third, there is a long-standing pattern of interdependence, measured in both trade and financial flows—capital has become transuational. Fourth, and perhaps most important, beneath the apparent prosperity and stability there is a sense within each great power of a real and growing vulnerability to the actions of others. Some nations fear that growing protectionism will shift the balance of the sys­tem against them, while others are convinced that maintaining the cur­rent system will be devastating to their interests. Today, observers focus on the first three phenomena, as they did prior to World War I, and argue that there is no economic basis for polit­ical conflict. What they miss is that the subsurface sense of insecurity— experienced by Japan, the United States, and Europe—marks the beginning of such conflict. Thus, the argument that war is obsolete because of growing inter­dependence is unsupportable. War may be obsolete, but, if it is, it is not because of interdependence. As we have seen, World War I broke out at a time when interdependence was substantially higher than it is today; indeed, in all likelihood war broke out because interdependence was so high. Today, war remains not only possible but, as a simple statistical matter, highly likely.

#### b) Causes water wars

Barlow, ‘1 [Maude, Chairs the Council of Canadians and was the founding co-chair of Action Canada Network Blue Gold, http:llwww.wellnessgoods.com/bluegold.asp]

Proponents say that such a system is the only way to distribute water to the world's thirsty. But, in fact, experience shows that selling water on the open market does not address the needs of poor, thirsty people. On the contrary, privatized water is delivered to those who can pay for it, such as wealthy cities and individuals and water-intensive industries, like agriculture and high-tech. As one resident of the high desert in New Mexico observed after his community's water had been diverted for use by the high-tech industry: "Water flows uphill to money." The push to commodify water comes at a time when the social, political and economic impacts of water scarcity are rapidly becoming a destabilizing force, with water-related conflicts springing up around the globe. For example, Malaysia, which supplies about half of Singapore's water, threatened to cut off that supply in 1997 after Singapore criticized its government policies. In Africa, relations between Botswana and Namibia have been severely strained by Namibian plans to construct a pipeline to divert water from the shared Okavango River to eastern Namibia. The Mayor of Mexico city has predicted a war in the Mexican Valley in the foreseeable future if a solution to his city's water crisis is not found soon. Much has been written about the potential for water wars in the Middle East, where water resources are severely limited. The late King Hussein of Jordan once said the only thing he would go to war with Israel over was water because Israel controls Jordan's water supply. Meanwhile, the future of one of the earth's most vital resources is being determined by those who profit from its overuse and abuse. A handful of transnational corporations, backed by the World Bank, are aggressively taking over the management of public water services in developing countries, dramatically raising the price of water to the local residents and profiting from the Third World's desperate search for solutions to the water crisis. The agenda is clear: water should be treated like any other tradable good, with its use determined by market principles. At the same time, governments are signing away their control over domestic water supplies by participating in trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); its successor, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These global trade institutions effectively give transnational corporations unprecedented access to the water of signatory countries. Already, corporations have started to sue governments in order to gain access to domestic water sources. For example, Sun Belt, a California company, is suing the government of Canada under NAFTA because British Columbia (B.C.) banned water exports several years ago. The company claims that B.C.'s law violates several NAFTA-based investor rights and therefore is claiming US$10 billion in compensation for lost profits. With the protection of these international trade agreements, companies are setting their sights on the mass transport of bulk water by diversion and by supertanker. Several companies are developing technology whereby large quantities of fresh water would be loaded into huge sealed bags and towed across the ocean for sale. Selling water to the highest bidder will only exacerbate the worst impacts of the world water crisis.

#### Those go nuclear

Weiner, ‘90 [Professor at Princeton, The Next 100 Years, p. 270]

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

#### Cuban economy growing now – less restrictions and cooperatives

Sabo ‘12 (Eric, “Castro Sees Acceptable Cuban Economic Growth of 3.7% Next Year”, Bloomberg, December 14 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-14/castro-sees-acceptable-cuban-economic-growth-of-3-7-next-year.html>)

Cuban President Raul Castro said that economic growth will be at an “acceptable” 3.7 percent next year as the communist government eases control over businesses and employment.

The Caribbean nation’s economy expanded a less than forecast 3.1 percent in 2012 even as tourist arrival jumped a record 4.9 percent, Castro told the National Assembly yesterday. The government had previously forecast growth of 3.4 percent for this year, he said.

The growth forecast for next year “is acceptable in a scenario of a continuing global economic crisis and persecution of Cuban bank transactions” due to the U.S. embargo, Castro said, according to a transcript of the speech posted on the government-run website Granma.

Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has taken measures to open the island’s economy, including loosening of property laws and controls prohibiting private enterprise such as taxi and mobile phone companies. Cooperatives with as many as five employees began managing their own operations this month, a policy meant to loosen restrictions on basic services and increase productivity.

Almost 400,000 Cubans are now self-employed, a number that should grow as the government allows more private enterprise, Castro said.

#### No impact – isolation forced sustainability

King 12 - (M. Dawn, Department of Political Science and Environmental Studies; “Cuban Sustainability: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Agriculture and Energy”, Western Political Science Association, March 21-24 2012, http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/kingmdawn.pdf)

Over the past fifty years, increased access to electricity and intensified agricultural production lifted millions out of extreme poverty. However, the world is consuming fossil fuels at a record pace to satiate global demands in the transportation, agriculture, and energy sectors while the effects of global warming, caused by this fossil fuel use, are already threatening human security by shifting agricultural zones and causing extreme weather patterns (USDA 2012). The same practices meant to solve the world’s resource and poverty problems, are now creating them. As energy prices soar, scholars often discuss the economic and environmental repercussions of hitting “peak oil” as something that may happen in the future. This study looks at Cuba, a country that faced “peak oil,” and argues that the world can learn valuable sustainability lessons from the Cuban experience. Cuba’s relative economic isolation in a globalizing world forced the country to adopt agricultural sustainability practices and invest in domestic energy sources (both renewable and non-renewable) when USSR petroleum imports were severely restricted, yet this same economic isolation impeded the Cuban government from achieving a sustainable energy system. Effective sustainability policies must strike a balance between purposive, centralized actions to reduce dependence on fossil-fuels coupled with decentralized capital investments that allow for new research, development, and infrastructure. Cuba is currently trying to find this balance.

#### Lifting the embargo won’t solve the Cuban economy

Cott ‘3(T. Norman Van Cott (tvancott@bsu.edu) is a professor of economics at Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana. June 2003, <http://www.fee.org/files/docLib/vancott0603.pdf> “The U.S. Embargo on Cuba: A Red Herring”)

An erroneous assumption plagues the now decades-old debate about the U.S. embargo on Cuba. Debaters, both pro and con, take it as given that Cubans would be inundated with things American should the embargo be lifted. Nothing could be further from the truth. For left-liberal opponents of the embargo, the error probably traces to wishful thinking—it seems they always want to prop up communist regimes. For conservative supporters of the embargo, the position probably reflects knee-jerk anxieties about the United States’ being played for a fool.¶ Wishful thinking and anxieties aside, no people in a country can buy things from other countries unless they can sell things to them. Those with little to sell necessarily buy little. Economic deprivation never put Tom, Dick, or Harry at the head of the line to buy things, and so it is with countries. Countries earn their spot in line by being productive.¶ With or without the U.S. embargo, Cuba has little to sell others. Its economy is a textbook example of what happens when the lifeblood of economic progress—private property and voluntary exchange—are trashed. For over 40 years, Cuban natural resources and human talent have wallowed in a communist quicksand of perverse incentives. The U.S. embargo didn’t put Cuba at the back of the line, thank you. No, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin taught Castro all he needed to know to get there. The embargo issue is a red herring when it comes to Cuba’s ability to buy from other countries.¶ It’s true that economists teach that international trade makes countries more productive. Does this mean that the embargo cuts Cuba out of these gains? Not at all. Gains from international trade are themselves the result of private property and voluntary exchange. They occur as owners of resources respond to price and profit signals implicit in world prices, thereby channeling the resources into areas of maximum national advantage. Cuba’s institutions prevent this.¶ What about U.S. capitalists’ funding a myriad of investment projects in Cuba if the embargo were abolished? Fat chance. Again, Cuba has a proven track record of hostility toward private property in general and foreign (especially U.S.) investment in particular. Capitalists have their own wealth on the line when funding new ventures. Only those bent on self-destruction would venture into a daunting situation like that of Cuba.¶ This is not to deny that numerous investment possibilities exist in Cuba. Why shouldn’t there be? The country has endured over 40 years of economic gobbledygook. But there is a deep chasm between potential investment projects and economically viable investment projects, a chasm made impassable in this case by Cuba’s intransigence when it comes to private property and voluntary exchange.

#### Trade strengthens repressive regimes – even if the economy appears to thrive, it’s terminally unsustainable

Jorge 2K (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University;"The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy," *Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers*, Online: http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

It follows, from all of the above, that a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit lines extended by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that greater contacts between the United States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization, it should be pointed out that such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In these countries, trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to and unaffected by the rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Castro’s regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.

#### Countless structural alt causes the embargo wouldn’t solve

Suchlicki 12(JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs “Getting Ready for Life after Castro” May 11 2012 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=0,2>)

The challenges are many. First, there will be the tremendous task of economic reconstruction. For nearly four decades, Cuba's extreme dependence on the Soviet bloc for trade, and the distorting effects of huge subsidies from Moscow, created an artificial economy. Most of Cuba's exports are in decline, and poverty is correspondingly growing. The internal market is weak, as domestic consumption is controlled by a strict and severe rationing system. Many transactions take place in the illegal black market, which operates in American dollars and with merchandise stolen from state enterprises or received from abroad. The Cuban peso has depreciated and its purchasing power has waned considerably. Huge and persistent government deficits, and the absence of virtually any stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies, have accelerated the downward spiraling of the economy. (Socio-Economic Reconstruction: Suggestions and Recommendations for Post-Castro Cuba, Antonio Jorge, and Institutions to Accompany the Market in Cuba, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata).¶ Moreover, sugar production, Cuba's mainstay export, has dropped to Great Depression levels. With low prices, a decline in sugar consumption worldwide, an increase in the number of competitive sugar producers, and widespread use of artificial sweeteners, sugar is a losing commodity with dire prospects for the future. Thus tourism, nickel exports, and even exile remittances have replaced sugar as the mainstay of the economy. Oil exploration in Cuba's northwestern waters seems promising, but profits must be shared with foreign partners, and costs are extremely high.¶ In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the Post-Castro Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Post-Castro Cuba, Mátias F. Traviesco-Diáz.) The U.S. and other countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, János Kornai).¶ Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry. Transportation is inadequate. Communication facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition, environmental concerns such as the pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention. (Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.)

#### No risk of bioterror

Stratfor 7, private intelligence agency, analyzes geopolitical trends, 12/21/ (“Bioterrorism: Sudden Death Overtime?,” http://www2.stratfor.com/analysis/bioterrorism\_sudden\_death\_overtime)

In this season of large college bowl games and the National Football League playoffs in the United States, and large nonsporting events such as the New Year’s Eve celebration in New York’s Times Square — not to mention the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing — a discussion of bioterrorism and the threat it poses might be of interest. First, it must be recognized that during the past several decades of the modern terrorist era, biological weapons have been used very infrequently — and there are some very good reasons for this. Contrary to their portrayal in movies and television shows, biological agents are difficult to manufacture and deploy effectively in the real world. In spite of the fear such substances engender, even in cases in which they have been somewhat effective they have proven to be less effective and more costly than more conventional attacks using firearms and explosives. In fact, nobody even noticed what was perhaps the largest malevolent deployment of biological agents in history, in which thousands of gallons of liquid anthrax and botulinum toxin were released during several attacks in a major metropolitan area over a three-year period. This use of biological agents was perpetrated by the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. An examination of the group’s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program provides some important insight into biological weapons, their costs — and their limitations. In the late 1980s, Aum’s team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Between April of 1990 and August of 1993, Aum conducted seven large-scale attacks involving the use of thousands of gallons of biological agents — four with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin. The group’s first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April of 1990, Aum used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the Diet and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of agent released, there were no mass casualties and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place. When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum’s scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax, and between June and August of 1993 the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks, but also use sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group’s successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred. Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. The team worked in large, modern facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. Despite the millions of dollars the group spent on its bioweapons program, it still faced problems in creating virulent biological agents, and it also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Even when the group switched to employing a nerve agent, it only succeeded in killing a handful of people. A comparison between the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack and the jihadist attack against the Madrid trains in 2004 shows that chemical/biological attacks are more expensive to produce and yield fewer results than attacks using conventional explosives. In the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack — Aum’s most successful — the group placed 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five different subway trains and killed 12 people. In the 2004 Madrid attack, jihadists detonated 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and killed 191 people. Aum’s CBW program cost millions and took years of research and effort; the Madrid bombings only cost a few thousand dollars, and the IEDs were assembled in a few days. The most deadly biological terrorism attack to date was the case involving a series of letters containing anthrax in the weeks following the Sept. 11 attacks — a case the FBI calls Amerithrax. While the Amerithrax letters did cause panic and result in companies all across the country temporarily shutting down if a panicked employee spotted a bit of drywall dust or powdered sugar from doughnuts eaten by someone on the last shift, in practical terms, the attacks were very ineffective. The Amerithrax letters resulted in five deaths; another 22 victims were infected but recovered after receiving medical treatment. The letters did not succeed in infecting senior officials at the media companies targeted by the first wave of letters, or Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, who were targeted by a second wave of letters. By way of comparison, John Mohammed, the so-called “D.C. Sniper,” was able to cause mass panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. This required far less time, effort and expense than producing the anthrax spores used in the Amerithrax case. It is this cost-benefit ratio that, from a militant’s perspective, makes firearms and explosives more attractive weapons for an attack. This then is the primary reason that more attacks using biological weapons have not been executed: The cost is higher than the benefit. Certainly, history has shown that militant organizations and homegrown militants are interested in large sporting events as venues for terror; one needs to look no further than the 1972 Munich Massacre, the 1980 Olympic Park bombing or even the 2005 incident in which University of Oklahoma student Joel Hinrichs died after a TATP-filled backpack he was wearing exploded outside a football game at Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, to see this. Because of this, vigilance is needed. However, militants planning such attacks will be far more likely to use firearms or IEDs in their attacks than they will biological agents. Unfortunately, in the real world guns and suicide bombs are far more common — and more deadly — than air horns filled with creepy bioterror.

#### No impact to bioterror

Mueller 99, John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State and Karl Mueller, June, ’99 (Foreign Affairs, l/n)

Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly developed and deployed, they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical, however, because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though knowledge of their destructive potential goes back centuries. (The English, for example, made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians during the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason, because biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control. Although terrorist groups or rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through advances in knowledge and technology, the record thus far is not likely to encourage them. Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and had little military impact. In the 1990s the large and extremely well funded Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality -- in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. For best results biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of dispersion, moreover, may destroy the organisms. And except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could spread back onto the attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures.

#### Zero risk of protectionism

**Ahearn 9** [Raymond, CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “The Global Economic Downturn and Protectionism,” March 23, 2009, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19395.pdf]

There are a number of reasons why the threat of a return to protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor policies could be vastly overstated. Unlike the 1930s, today’s global economy has several strong firewalls to prevent governments from raising trade barriers that result in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. These firewalls include more institutionalized obstacles to protectionism built into the WTO system, more policy instruments to address the economic slowdown, and a more interdependent and open world economy than existed in the 1930s. In addition, some in today’s media may tend to overstate the threat of protectionism by not always distinguishing between protectionist actions and protectionist pressures and/or by equating legitimate forms of protection with protectionism. The fact that there is ample room for increases in trade measures and barriers that are consistent with the rules and obligations of the WTO often may go unappreciated in some press coverage. These trade measures and barriers include increases in applied tariffs to bound rates, and imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties, so-called ‘defensive’ trade measures.4 Protection for limited periods of time and under prescribed conditions is built into the rules of the WTO as a political safety valve and as a recognition of the human and social costs that are associated with the often wrenching adjustments that accompany increased trade competition. Firewalls Against Protectionism WTO rules today serve to keep a lid on trade barriers of its 153 members through an elaborate set of mutual obligations and dispute settlement procedures. Unlike the 1930s when countries could impose higher trade barriers unilaterally without violating any international agreements or anticipating a foreign reaction, under today’s rules members can take their disputes to the WTO for settlement rather than engaging in reciprocal retaliatory actions. The fact that countries violating WTO obligations can face WTO-sanctioned retaliation helps constrain outbreaks of unilateral actions that could be mutually harmful.5 Pressures for protection are also dampened by a world economy that is much more interdependent and integrated than in the 1930s.6 Leading producers have become so international in their production operations and supply chains that they have developed a vested interest in resisting protectionism.7 Many industries that have faced import competition in the past – such as televisions and semiconductors—have found that international diversification or joint ventures with foreign partners are a more profitable way of coping with global competition than blocking goods at the border. In addition, many domestic industries have less incentive to ask for import restrictions because foreign rivals now produce in the domestic market, eliminating the benefits of trade barriers for domestic firms.8 Unlike the early 1930s, when governments took little responsibility for propping up financial institutions and were unable to pursue expansionary monetary policies due to fixed exchange rates under the gold standard, policymakers around the world today are adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. These expansionary policies, in turn, have the capability of dampening protectionist pressures and demands that stem from job losses and related economic hardship with lower interest rates and increased expenditures on unemployment benefits and health care benefits.9 A related consideration is that today’s world economy is much more open than the world economy of the 1930s. Average tariffs on world trade have come down from the 50% range in the 1930s, to the 25% range in the 1980s, and to less than 10% today.10 Under these circumstances, it would require tremendous increases in protection to get the world back to anywhere near the conditions of the 1930s, although a major increase in tariffs (e.g. a doubling) would be disruptive even if it left tariffs well below the 1930s levels. Scorecard of Protective Measures To Date Empirical support exists for the view that existing legal, economic, and political firewalls are restraining today’s protectionist pressures. Most importantly, Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s Director General, reported in January 2009 that most WTO members have successfully kept domestic protectionist pressures under control “with only limited evidence of increases in trade restricting or trade distorting measures” taken during the last six months of 2008. This assessment was based on the first report of the WTO secretariat on the trade effects of the global economic crisis. The report found only “limited evidence” of an increase in tariffs, non-tariff barriers or trade-remedy actions by member countries, but noted that the most significant actions taken in response to the global crisis have involved “financial support of one kind or another to banks and other financial institutions and to certain industries, notably the automobile industry.”11 The WTO report notes tariff increases on selected products being implemented by India, Russia, Ecuador, and Ukraine. Countries adopting non-tariff measures include Indonesia (port of entry barriers) and Argentina (import licensing requirements). Argentina was cited for measures that attempt to boost exports of selected products. But the report indicates that there has been “no dramatic increase” in antidumping investigations in the second half of 2008 compared to first half of 2008, but raised the possibility of increased trade remedy actions in 2009.12 The World Bank, which has also been monitoring trade restrictions proposed and adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis, reached a conclusion similar to that of the WTO. Its initial report determined that there have been 47 trade restrictive measures imposed since the financial crisis began last summer, including 17 from G-20 countries, but that “these measures have probably had only marginal effects on trade flows to date.” In addition to the measures cited by the WTO, the World Bank report cited China’s import ban on various food products from the EU, and export subsidies provided by the EU, China, and India. Contrary to the WTO report, the World Bank report determined that “the number of antidumping cases (both investigations initiated and imposition of duties) surged in 2008.”13

## Leadership

#### No war over Taiwan – relations stabilizing

Bush, 10

[Richard C Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “China-Taiwan: Recent Economic, Political, and Military Developments Across the Strait, and Implications for the United States,” 3/18/10, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318\_china\_economy\_bush.aspx]

What is the trajectory of the current process? Conceptually, there are at least two possibilities. On the one hand, and more consequential, what we are watching might reflect movement toward the resolution of the fundamental dispute between the two sides. One type of resolution would be unification according to the PRC’s one-county, two-systems formula, but there are others. On the other hand, what we are seeing could be the stabilization of cross-Strait relations. That term implies several things: increasing two-way contact, reducing mutual fear, increasing mutual trust and predictability, expanding areas of cooperation, institutionalizing interaction, and so on. It constitutes a shift from the conflicted coexistence of the 1995-2008 period to a more relaxed coexistence. Examples of this process at work are the array of economic agreements that the two sides have concluded, removing obstacles to closer interchange; China’s approval for Taiwan to attend the 2009 meeting of the World Health Assembly; and the two sides’ tacit agreement that neither will steal the other’s diplomatic partners.

In and of itself, stabilization does not lead ineluctably to a resolution of the China-Taiwan dispute—however much Beijing prefers inevitability and however much some in Taiwan fear it. President Ma has been quite explicit that unification will not be discussed during his term of office, whether that is four or eight years. The Chinese leadership at least realizes that the current situation is better than the previous one and understands that resolution will be a long-term process.

Certainly, however, stabilization can create a better climate for resolution. It’s easier to address the tough conceptual issues that are at the heart of this dispute in an environment of greater mutual trust. But I don’t see that happening anytime soon. Stabilization can also evolve very incrementally toward resolution, either through better mutual understanding or because one side, knowingly or unknowingly, makes concessions to the other. How stabilization might migrate to resolution brings me to the Commission’s questions.

China’s Initiatives

Since 2005, and in contrast to past periods, China’s approach to Taiwan has been rather skillful. President Hu Jintao shifted the priority from achieving unification in the near or medium term to opposing Taiwan independence (unification remains the long-term goal). Although he speaks about the need for the two sides to “scrupulously abide by the one-China principle,” he has been prepared, for the sake of achieving substantive progress, to tolerate so far the Ma administration’s quite ambiguous approach to that issue. The Beijing leadership recognizes the importance of building mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges after a decade-plus of mutual fear. It is emphasizing what the two sides have in common—economic cooperation and Chinese culture—and agreed to reduce somewhat the zero-sum competition in the international arena. Through its policies and interactions, it is trying to build up support for a PRC-friendly public on Taiwan. It sees the value of institutionalizing a more stable cross-Strait relationship.

The exception to this trend is the continuation of the People’s Liberation Army’s acquisition of capabilities that are relevant to a Taiwan contingency. Why this build-up continues, in spite of the decline in tensions since President Ma took office, is puzzling. After all, Ma’s policies reduce significantly what Beijing regarded as a serious national security problem. China is more secure today than two years ago, yet it continues to make Taiwan more vulnerable. Possible explanations are rigid procurement schedules; the inability of civilian leaders to impose a change even when it makes policy sense; and a decision to fill out its capacity to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, in case a future Taiwan government challenges China’s fundamental interests. The answer is not clear. I am inclined to believe that it is a combination of the second and third reasons.

What is clear is that this trend is in no one's interests – Taiwan's, China's or the United States'. Taiwan's leaders are unlikely to negotiate seriously on the issues on Beijing's agenda under a darkening cloud of possible coercion and intimidation. The Taiwanese people will not continue to support pro-engagement leaders if they conclude that this policy has made Taiwan less secure. The U.S. will not benefit if mutual fear again pervades the Taiwan Strait.

Where do Current Trends Lead?

To be honest, I do not know. I cannot rule out the possibility that gradually and over time the Taiwan public and political leaders will abandon decades of opposition to one-country, two systems and choose to let Taiwan become a special administrative region of the PRC. But I doubt it. Despite the consciousness on the island of China’s growing power and leverage, there is still a broad consensus that the Republic of China (or Taiwan) is a sovereign state, a position that is inconsistent with China’s formula. Moreover, because of the provisions of the ROC constitution, fundamental change of the sort that Beijing wants would require constitutional amendments and therefore a broad and strong political consensus, which does not exist at this time.

So if political integration is to occur in the next couple of decades, it will occur not because of the cumulative impact of economic integration but because Beijing has decided to make Taiwan an offer that is better than one-country, two systems. So far, I see no sign it will do so.

The more likely future is the continued creation and consolidation of a stabilized order, one in which economic interdependence deepens, social and cultural interaction grows, competition in the international community is muted, and all these arrangements will be institutionalized to one degree or another. But none of this will be automatic. Issues relevant to the resolution of the dispute (e.g. whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity) may come up in the process of stabilization and dealt with in ways that do not hurt either side’s interests And the issue of China’s growing military power—and what it reflects about PLA intentions—remains.

#### Interdependence will deescalate conflict

Saunders and Kastner, 9

[Phillip, senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, Scott, assistant professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, “Is a China-Taiwan Peace Deal in the Cards?” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/27/is\_a\_china\_taiwan\_peace\_deal\_in\_the\_cards?page=0,0]

Since Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration as president of Taiwan in May 2008, mainland China and Taiwan have established direct shipping, air transport, and postal links; opened Taiwan to mainland tourists; and increased financial cooperation. The two sides are now negotiating a far-reaching economic cooperation agreement. This new atmosphere has greatly reduced the chances of a cross-strait confrontation that might draw the United States and China into a military conflict. Indeed, China and Taiwan recently announced plans for 100 swimmers to swim five miles from the Chinese city of Xiamen to the Taiwan-controlled island of Jinmen. The offshore islands -- once a Cold War flashpoint -- have become a symbol of the dramatic improvement in cross-strait relations.

Leaders on both sides have expressed interest in consolidating the improved relationship by negotiating a peace agreement. The recent warming trend suggests that it is now worth thinking seriously about how a peace agreement might work and what implications it might have for the United States.

To start: Realistically, at what point could a peace agreement bridge the divide between Beijing and Taipei?

Despite improved relations, political conditions are not ripe for a permanent resolution of Taiwan's status. China still regards Taiwan as part of its territory and seeks unification, preferably achieved through peaceful means (though Beijing has refused to renounce the use of force). Taiwan's constitution retains formal links to mainland China, but the island enjoys de facto sovereignty and some political forces seek total independence.

Public opinion polls in Taiwan show that 75 to 80 percent of people on the island favor preservation of the status quo, at least for now. Beijing appears to have recognized this reality; President Hu Jintao's "eight points" speech at the end of 2008 implicitly acknowledged that an extended period of time would be needed before unification could be achieved. For now, China aims to deter Taiwanese independence while creating conditions of "peaceful development" via strengthened cross-strait economic, political, and social ties.

Although a permanent resolution of Taiwan's status remains a long-term proposition, an interim peace agreement -- trading a Taiwanese commitment not to move toward independence for a Chinese commitment not to use force -- seems increasingly possible. Taiwan's leaders have been interested in such an agreement for several years. Both presidential candidates called for negotiation of a peace agreement during the 2008 campaign. Beijing first endorsed the idea in 2005, and Chinese leaders have incorporated the call to "end the state of hostilities and negotiate a peace agreement" in their major statements on Taiwan since 2007.

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.

Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### No challengers

Kaplan, senior fellow – Center for a New American Security, and Kaplan, frmr. vice chairman – National Intelligence Council, ‘11

(Robert D and Stephen S, “America Primed,” *The National Interest*, March/April)

But in spite of the seemingly inevitable and rapid diminution of U.S. eminence, to write America’s great-power obituary is beyond premature. The United States remains a highly capable power. Iraq and Afghanistan, as horrendous as they have proved to be—in a broad historical sense—are still relatively minor events that America can easily overcome. The eventual demise of empires like those of Ming China and late-medieval Venice was brought about by far more pivotal blunders.

Think of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 and 1858. Iraq in particular—ever so frequently touted as our turning point on the road to destruction—looks to some extent eerily similar. At the time, orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure (who wanted to leave traditional India as it was) lost some sway to evangelical and utilitarian reformers (who wanted to modernize and Christianize India—to make it more like England). But the attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilization to the Asian subcontinent was met with a violent revolt against imperial authority. Delhi, Lucknow and other Indian cities were besieged and captured before being retaken by colonial forces. Yet, the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire at all, which continued on and even expanded for another century. Instead, it signaled the transition from more of an ad hoc imperium fired by a proselytizing lust to impose its values on others to a calmer and more pragmatic empire built on international trade and technology.1 There is no reason to believe that the fate of America need follow a more doomed course.

Yes, the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States’ own, but, though destructive, they are not fatal. If we withdraw sooner rather than later, the cost to American power can be stemmed. Leaving a stable Afghanistan behind of course requires a helpful Pakistan, but with more pressure Washington might increase Islamabad’s cooperation in relatively short order.

In terms of acute threats, Iran is the only state that has exported terrorism and insurgency toward a strategic purpose, yet the country is economically fragile and politically unstable, with behind-the-scenes infighting that would make Washington partisans blanch. Even assuming Iran acquires a few nuclear devices—of uncertain quality with uncertain delivery systems—the long-term outlook for the clerical regime is itself unclear. The administration must only avoid a war with the Islamic Republic.

To be sure, America may be in decline in relative terms compared to some other powers, as well as to many countries of the former third world, but in absolute terms, particularly military ones, the United States can easily be the first among equals for decades hence.

China, India and Russia are the only major Eurasian states prepared to wield military power of consequence on their peripheries. And each, in turn, faces its own obstacles on the road to some degree of dominance.

The Chinese will have a great navy (assuming their economy does not implode) and that will enforce a certain level of bipolarity in the world system. But Beijing will lack the alliance network Washington has, even as China and Russia will always be—because of geography—inherently distrustful of one another. China has much influence, but no credible military allies beyond possibly North Korea, and its authoritarian regime lives in fear of internal disruption if its economic growth rate falters. Furthermore, Chinese naval planners look out from their coastline and see South Korea and a string of islands—Japan, Taiwan and Australia—that are American allies, as are, to a lesser degree, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. To balance a rising China, Washington must only preserve its naval and air assets at their current levels.

India, which has its own internal insurgency, is bedeviled by semifailed states on its borders that critically sap energy and attention from its security establishment, and especially from its land forces; in any case, India has become a de facto ally of the United States whose very rise, in and of itself, helps to balance China.

Russia will be occupied for years regaining influence in its post-Soviet near abroad, particularly in Ukraine, whose feisty independence constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very idea of the Russian state. China checks Russia in Central Asia, as do Turkey, Iran and the West in the Caucasus. This is to say nothing of Russia’s diminishing population and overwhelming reliance on energy exports. Given the problems of these other states, America remains fortunate indeed.

The United States is poised to tread the path of postmutiny Britain. America might not be an empire in the formal sense, but its obligations and constellation of military bases worldwide put it in an imperial-like situation, particularly because its air and naval deployments will continue in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world. No country is in such an enviable position to keep the relative peace in Eurasia as is the United States—especially if it can recover the level of enduring competence in national-security policy last seen during the administration of George H. W. Bush. This is no small point. America has strategic advantages and can enhance its power while extricating itself from war. But this requires leadership—not great and inspiring leadership which comes along rarely even in the healthiest of societies—but plodding competence, occasionally steely nerved and always free of illusion.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Mastanduno, 9 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth

(Michael, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

Retrenchment sustains leadership and solves conflict

**Parent and MacDonald 11** (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College., November/December 2011, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward, www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html)

Even if a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? The historical record suggests it would. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century. Retrenchment works in several ways. One is by shifting commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas. This can help pare back the number of potential flashpoints with emerging adversaries by decreasing the odds of accidental clashes, as well as reducing the incentives of regional powers to respond confrontationally. Whereas primacy forces a state to defend a vast and brittle perimeter, a policy of retrenchment allows it to respond to significant threats at the times and in the places of its choosing. Conflict does not become entirely elective, as threats to core interests still must be met. But for the United States, retrenchment would reduce the overall burden of defense, as well as the danger of becoming bogged down in a marginal morass. It would also encourage U.S. allies to assume more responsibility for collective security. Such burden sharing would be more equitable for U.S. taxpayers, who today shoulder a disproportionate load in securing the world. Every year, according to Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, they pay an average of $2,065 each in taxes to cover the cost of national defense, compared with $1,000 for Britons, $430 for Germans, and $340 for Japanese. Despite spending far less on defense, the United States' traditional allies have little trouble protecting their vital interests. No state credibly threatens the territorial integrity of either western European countries or Japan, and U.S. allies do not need independent power- projection capabilities to protect their homelands. NATO's intervention in Libya has been flawed in many respects, but it has demonstrated that European member states are capable of conducting complex military operations with the United States playing a secondary role. Going forward, U.S. retrenchment would compel U.S. allies to improve their existing capabilities and bear the costs of their altruistic impulses. The United States and its allies have basically the same goals: democracy, stability, and trade. But the United States is in the awkward position of both being spread too thin around the globe and irritating many states by its presence on, or near, their soil. Delegating some of its responsibilities to allies would permit the U.S. government to focus more on critical objectives, such as ensuring a stable and prosperous economy. Regional partners, who have a greater stake in and knowledge of local challenges, can take on more responsibility. With increased input from others and a less invasive presence, retrenchment would also allow the United States to restore some luster to its leadership.

# 2NC

## Taiwan war

### No war

#### No risk of war – economic ties and new strategic thinking in China encourage moderation – that’s Friedberg.

#### Economic incentives

Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator – Financial Times, ‘11

(Gideon, “Think Again: American Decline,” *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb)

Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence, it would be a big mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U.S. power will simply disappear. Once countries get the hang of economic growth, it takes a great deal to throw them off course. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats, hyperinflation, the Great Depression, the collapse of democracy, and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. And yet by the end of the 1950s, West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies, albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions.

In a nuclear age, China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war, so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward, no matter what obstacles lie in its path.

#### Stability is the key motivating factor for China – prevents conflict

AP, 3/9/’11

(“China challenges U.S. edge in Asia-Pacific”)

If U.S. military planners are worried about that possibility, they are not showing it. They say plans to cap defense spending within five years will not derail modernization plans. Pacific Command chief Adm. Robert Willard said last month that, while the United States carefully watches China’s growing military capabilities - and urges greater openness from China about them - the United States does not need to change its strategy.

China maintains it does not have offensive intentions, and analysts say that military action in the region would hurt its export-driven economy, which could threaten what its government prizes above all else - domestic stability. The U.S. military presence also may benefit China as it restrains neighbors like South Korea and Japan from seeking nuclear weapons.

As U.S. and Chinese forces increasingly rub up against each other in the western Pacific, the United States says it wants to promote military ties with China to prevent a chance skirmish and for China to develop as a “responsible major power.” To date, China has been reluctant to engage meaningfully after the recent restoration of military ties that were cut over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

“This is not the Cold War with two rival camps facing each other,” said Michael Schiffer, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. “We are seeking a military-to-military relationship that is broad and deep enough to manage our differences while expanding on areas of common interest.”

#### Deterrence

**Friedberg 2005**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45

As during the Cold War, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons by the two polar powers should serve as an additional source of constraint on their behavior. This factor is stressed, for example, by Avery Goldstein who argues that it provides “the strongest reasons to expect that the dangers associated with China’s arrival as a full-fledged great power will be limited.” Goldstein suggests that, as participants in what Robert Jervis has called the “nuclear revolution,” the United States and China have already entered into an “easily established [relationship] of mutual deterrence that provide[s] not only a robust buffer against general war, but also a strong constraint on both limited war and crisis behavior.”55

#### No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out

Roger **Cliff,** Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. **Shlapak**, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 200**7**

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

#### US first strike solves

Lieber, Professor of Poli Sci – Notre Dame, and Press, Professor of Poli Sci – University of Pennsylvania, ‘6

(Keir and Daryl, The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs)

China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours.) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

## Heg

### Data

#### Data should frame the impact debate – wars have never correlated to US military spending or international activism – that’s Fettweis.

#### Their laundry list of vague impacts is academic junk – conflicts can’t just emerge

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed.

That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before.

Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.

Overestimating Our Importance

One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57

It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated.

In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

### Doesn’t solve war

#### Heg doesn’t solve war. Politics are shifting away from a global balance of power – regionalism prevents influence, that’s Mastanduno.

#### Empirics prove heg is useless

Mearsheimer, professor of political science – University of Chicago, 12/16/’10

(John, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/imperial-by-design-4576>)

U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama’s and Krauthammer’s early analyses.

The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison’s observation that “no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified.

To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory.

The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post–Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict`; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel.

The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that “looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power.” Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

#### Can’t contain newer threats

G. John **Ikenberry** Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2010 38: 509 originally published online 10 May 2010 G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea. His forthcoming book is Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Triumph, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order 10. “The Liberal International Order and its Discontents” World Politics 61, no. 1 (20**09**): 5. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38 (3)

The sources of insecurity in world politics have also evolved since the early decades that shaped American liberal hegemony. As noted earlier, the threat to peace is no longer primarily from great powers engaged in security competition. The result has been a shift in the ways in which violence is manifest. In the past, only powerful states were able to gain access to the destructive capabilities that could threaten other societies. Today, it is possible to see technology and the globalisation of the world system as creating opportunities for non-state actors – or transnational gangs – to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As a result, it is now the weakness of states and their inability to enforce law and order within their own societies that provide the most worrisome dangers to the inter- national system. In contrast to earlier eras, there is no single enemy – or source of vio- lence and insecurity – that frames and reinforces the American-led liberal order. The United States and other states face a diffuse array of threats and challenges. Global warming, health pandemics, nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy scarcity – these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats could endanger Western lives and liberal ways of life either directly or indirectly by destabilising the global system upon which security and prosperity depend. Pandemics and global warming are not threats wielded by human hands, but their consequences could be equally devastating. Highly infectious disease has the potential to kill millions of people. Global warming threatens to trigger waves of environmental migration and food shortages, further destabilising weak and poor states around the world. The world is also on the cusp of a new round of nuclear proliferation, putting mankind’s deadliest weapons in the hands of unstable and hostile states. Terrorist networks offer a new spectre of non-state transnational violence. The point is that none of these threats are, in themselves, so singularly pre-eminent that they deserve to be the centrepiece of American national security as were anti-fascism and anti-communism in an earlier era.

## Trade

## Trade turns

### 2nc war ext

#### Trade causes war—Germany and France were highly interdependent and fought all the time, the reason the Cold War never erupted into conflict is because neither the US nor the Soviet Union relied on each other economically—means we internal link turn their conflict arguments—prefer our evidence—it cites applied empirics which is different that broad statistical studies—

#### Re-testing proves the Trade-peace thesis is flawed

**Barbieri 02** [Katherine, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace, p. 45-48]

Even at the dyadic level, the empirical findings are mixed. Wallensteen (1973) and my own work provide evidence of the conflictual nature of interdependent relationships. These analyses include a more comprehensive temporal and spatial domain than those found in dyadic studies that support the trade­ promotes-peace hypothesis and are therefore more generalizable to a diverse group of trading relationships.

#### We have studies too

**Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, ‘8** [Philippe, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Thierry, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, “Make Trade Not War?” The Review of Economic Studies, <http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/MMT.pdf>]

This paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade. We show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial, military conflicts reduce trade, and leaders are rational. When war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict. We test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950–2000 period. Using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues, including instrumental variables, we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness. For proximate countries, we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict.

### 2nc water wars ext

#### Trade turns water into a commodity whereby only those who can afford it can drink it. Those in the richest countries have the highest demand and suck other parts of the world dry. Lack of water in these parts induce water conflicts which are sure to release nuclear weapons—that’s Barlow and Weiner.

#### Prefer our conflict scenario—water is critical to all life function—makes those conflicts uniquely probable.

#### And, it destroys the environment

**Lang and Hines, ‘93** [Tim, Director of Parents for Safe Food and Colin, Coordinator of Greenpeace International’s Economic Unit, The New Protectionism, p. 62-63]

The gearing of entire economies to increasing raw material exports for international trade also has its environmental impact at the point of extraction or production, especially in developing countries. Tropical timber is perhaps the best publicized case. Although the massive deforestation of the last decade has a range of causes, including clearing land for agriculture and grazing, mining, fuelwood gathering and trees felled fordomestic use, the timber trade represents a significant proportion, about 50 per cent of the total production of industrial hardwood in tropical countries.8 The effect of timber trading on deforestation is larger than the mere numbers of trees cut down for export, since roads built for commercial logging bring in their wake farmers, miners and those seeking fuel wood. In 1991, this tropical timber industry was worth $6 billion, butit is beginning to decline as forests are decimated in one country after another to provide for the needs of Europe, Japan and North America. Thailand and the Philippines, which were once exporters, are now net importers; Nigeria’s exports have slumped over the last decade and several other countries will soon be in thesame position. At its most extreme, Sarawak, which along with Sabah provides more than 90 per cent of Japan’s tropical imports, is predicted by environmentalists to have no trees left for felling in five years time.This would be both an environmental disaster and a human tragedy, since it would destroy the homeland of the local Penan people, who are aggressively fighting this trend.9 The fate of timber in international trade is repeated with other commodities sold by the South. Developing countries exploit resources such as food, fish, minerals and energy for export mostly to repay debts, with often dire adverse environmental effects

#### That culminates in extinction

Kaufmann 81(Les Kaufmann, Chief Scientist at Edgerton Research Lab, THE LAST EXTINCTION, 1981, p. 4)

The fourth argument for preserving biological diversity is the simplest: Our lives depend on it. We are part of a common fabric of life. Our survival is dependent on the integrity of this fabric, for the loss of a few critical threads could lead to a quick unraveling of the whole. We know that there have been previous mass extinctions, through which some life survived. As for our own chances of surviving this mass extinction, there can be no promises. If the Grim Reaper plays any favorites at all, then it would seem to be a special fondness for striking down dominant organisms in their prime. David Joblinski examines the fates of rudist dames, mammalike reptiles, dinosaurs, and a host of other scintillating but doomed creatures in his essay. Humans are now the dominant creatures, at least in terms of their influence. So, lest history bear false witness and barring some serious conservation efforts on our part, this mass extinction could well be the last one that we will ever know about.

#### Gartzke is biased---missing variables

Han 12 (Zhen- MA, Political Science, University of British Columbia, March 2012, “The Capitalist Peace Revisited: A New Liberal Peace Model and the Impact of Market Fluctuations,” https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/41809/ubc\_2012\_spring\_han\_zhen.pdf?sequence=1

The missing value problem needs serious attention for the students who study liberal peace models. Dafoe finds that missing values in Gartzke’s models are systematically associated with its major explanatory variable—market openness96 , thus leads to a biased conclusion. For example, China, the U.S.S.R, and North Korea were involved in several militarized interstate conflicts, but a significant part of the market openness is missing for these countries97, and excluding these cases from the model leads to a bias. While Dafoe assigns value 1 (least open to financial market) to all the missing values of China, U.S.S.R and North Korea, he finds that market openness lost its significance and democracy become significant again98. But Dafoe’s approach can be problematic as well, because these nations may be open to each other while staying closed to the west or the global financial markets. In case of North Korea, foreign capital from the U .S.S.R and China are pivotal to the survival of the regime.

## Repression turn

### 2nc repression turn

#### They’ve mishandled the turn – keeping the embargo is net-better for the Cuban economy – development would strengthen Castro repression which turns case – that’s Jorge – means you can vote neg on presumption

#### Economic development post-embargo won’t yield a democratic transition

Lopez 2K (Juan, former professor of political science at the University of Illinois; “Sanctions on Cuba Are Good, But Not Enough,” *Orbis*, Volume 44, Issue 3, June, p. 345-362, EBSCOhost)

The engagement thesis also claims that economic development tends to promote democracy, an old hypothesis dating from the 1950s work of Seymour Martin Lipset.(n19) But the empirical evidence of the past fifty years suggests that this hypothesis is also false. Countries under dictatorial regimes are not more likely to experience a transition to democracy as they reach higher levels of economic development.(n20) Nevertheless, the idea that development generates democracy continues to be presented as if it were true and is one of the key arguments used by USA Engage to justify its opposition to the U.S. embargo. Samuel Huntington has also argued that economic development produces democracy by creating new sources of wealth and power outside state control. However, if one considers the intervening mechanism between development and democracy in Huntington's reasoning, one finds that, whatever its validity elsewhere, it does not hold up in the Cuban case. If increased wealth simply accrues to the state, as in Cuba, then (as Huntington himself acknowledges) the additional revenue merely increases the power of the state and makes no contribution to democratization.

#### Cuba econ inevitably crashes – Castro repression

Jorge 2K (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University; "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy," *Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers*, Online: http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

Under the real world of Castroism, however, the answer must be a terse one: none. The embargo has not harmed the Cuban economy. Cooperation between the United States and Cuba would have been impossible from the very beginning of the Revolution for legal, political, ideological, strategic, and economic reasons, not to mention others of a philosophical or moral character. In other words, it was in the past, and continues to be at present, contrary to the United States’ national interest and to its fundamental foreign policy orientation and objectives to lift the embargo under Castro’s conditions: that is, without a firm commitment to the political democratization and market reforms that his regime has stubbornly opposed for the last 40 years. However, if, purely for the sake of an intellectual exercise, we were to assume that the embargo had never existed, its nonexistence would have had no effect whatsoever on the Cuban economy. Castro simply would have squandered U.S. instead of Soviet resources. Given Castro’s objectives and policies, the ultimate result for the Cuban economy could not have been any different, regardless of who had financed his Revolution.

#### Castro regime shuts down new investment after the plan

Suchlicki ‘7-Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the University of Miami (Jaime, “Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel Ban of Cuba”, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12/11/07, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/website\_documents/SenateTestimony.pdf)

Investments¶ • Cuba has promoted investments in tourism as its highest priority and only recently has begun to promote investments in other sectors. Cuba has not permitted greater individual freedom in economic matters. Unlike China, Cuba has not legalized private agriculture or manufacturing. ¶ • Investments are directed and approved by the Cuban government. They would be limited, however, given the lack of an extensive internal market, the uncertainties surroundings the long-term risk to foreign investment, an uncertain political situation; and the opportunities provided by other markets in Latin America and elsewhere. ¶ • The Cuban constitution still outlaws foreign ownership of most properties and forbids any Cubans from participating in joint ventures with foreigners. ¶ • It is illegal for foreign companies to hire Cuban workers directly. Foreign employers must pay the wages owed to their employees directly to the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban government then pays out to the Cuban workers in Cuban pesos, which are worth a fraction of the hard currency. ¶ • All arbitration most take place in the corrupt and arbitrary government offices or in the government controlled judiciary, where little protection is given to the investor. ¶ • Foreign investors must also confront political uncertainties that do not exist in many other countries. They must contend with the possibility of the regime’s reversing its policies, the legal questions surrounding previously confiscated properties, and potential sanctions against foreign investors that cooperated with the Castro government in the event that an anti-Castro government eventually comes to power. ¶ • Opposition to market reforms will limit the extent to which the private sector emerges and functions effectively, and thereby will slow, if not prevent, attaining a measurable degree of economic recovery. The Castro brothers fear the likely erosion of political power that accompanies the restructuring of the economy along free market rules. Adoption of market reforms may well represent a solution to the economic crisis, but a full-blown reform process carries with it the risk of loss of control over society, as well as the economy, and threatens to alienate some of the regime’s key constituencies.

#### Cuban military controls key economic sectors – prevents solvency

Suchlicki ‘12- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the University of Miami (Jaime, “Getting Ready for Life after Castro”, 5/11/12, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting\_ready\_for\_life\_after\_castro?page=full)

Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only challenges facing Cuba in the future. A major problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of the military. (The Cuban Military and Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent years, the military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario, the military will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited democratic system in which Cubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the political process.¶ An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible. A powerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as an unacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence. Its control of key economic sectors under the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its role strictly to external security. Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy may not be able to absorb large numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them.

#### Any revenue generated post-plan strengthens Castro – turns case

Radosh ’13 (Ron, adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute; “Ron Radosh: The Time to Help Cuba’s Brave Dissidents Is Now- Why the Embargo Must Not be Lifted,” March 20th, Online: <http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/ron-radosh-the-time-to-help-cubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/>)

What these liberals and leftists leave out is that this demand — lifting the embargo — is also the number one desire of the Cuban Communists. In making it the key demand, these well-meaning (at least some of them) liberals echo precisely the propaganda of the Cuban government, thereby doing the Castro brothers’ work for them here in the United States. And, as we know, many of those who call for this actually believe that the Cuban government is on the side of the people, and favor the Cuban Revolution which they see as a positive role model for the region. They have always believed, since the 1960s of their youth, that socialism in Cuba has pointed the way forward to development and liberty based on the kind of socialist society they wish could exist in the United States.¶ Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually taped a television interview filmed illegally in Havana. “Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio Rodiles,” an American support group called Capitol Hill Cubans has reported, “has just released the latest episode of his civil society project Estado de Sats (filmed within Cuba), where he discusses the importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cuba’s most renowned opposition activists and former political prisoners, Guillermo Fariñas and Jose Daniel Ferrer.”¶ The argument they present is aimed directly at those on the left in the United States, some of whom think they are helping democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two dissidents say the following:¶ If at this time, the [economic] need of the Cuban government is satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of the embargo, repression would increase, it would allow for a continuation of the Castro’s society, totalitarianism would strengthen its hold and philosophically, it would just be immoral … If you did an opinion poll among Cuban opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting the embargo.

## Alt causes

### 2nc

#### Multiple structural alt causes to Cuban economic collapse removing the embargo doesn’t solve – this is **Suchlicki:**

**a) Exports are in decline which translates to a weak internal market – revenue goes to the black market**

**b) Cuban peso is depreciating – lack of a stabilizing fiscal policy**

**c) Sugar production is down because it’s a losing commodity**

**d) Insurmountable legal obstacles because of asset and compensation disputes – those prevent foreign investment**

**e) Lack of infrastructure and communication wreck resiliency**

#### Several alt causes external to the embargo – comparative evidence

Laverty ‘11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA\_Cubas\_New\_Resolve.pdf)

Today, the principal peril that Cuba faces comes not from the United States’ ineffective threat but from its own crushing economic realities. The country’s government is struggling with both demographic burdens and pressures from global creditors. It cannot ignore either. Cuba’s nearly intractable problems stem from the limited ways in which its economy produces wealth, its heavy reliance on imports to feed its population, growing domestic economic inequality, and the lack of opportunities for citizens to productively use knowledge acquired through advanced education.

#### Natural disasters, fluctuations, and Venezuela are alt causes

Laverty ‘11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA\_Cubas\_New\_Resolve.pdf)

There are game-changing events outside of Cuba’s control that can negatively affect the future success of the reforms. Cuba’s economic reforms cannot insulate the island from hurricanes, global fluctuations in food prices, nickel prices, and tourism flows, or the risk that Venezuela’s voters or their president’s poor health will sever the lifeline of petroleum that flows from Caracas to Havana.

#### Marxism is the cause of Cuba’s stagnant economy – not the embargo

Suchlicki 2k(JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj) Note: The first line of the card is saying an aff argument and then refuting it.

The Cubans are suffering economically because of the U.S. embargo. ¶ The Cubans can buy any products, including food and medicine from any country in the world. Dollar stores in Cuba have numerous U.S. products, including Coca-Cola, and other symbols of American consumerism. American dollars can purchase almost anything in Cuba. There are shortages in Cuba of fruits, vegetables, potatoes, bananas, mangos, boniatos, and other foodstuffs that have been traditionally produced locally. What do these shortages have to do with the U.S. embargo? The reason for Cuba’s economic suffering is a Marxist system that discourages incentives. As in Eastern Europe under Communism, the failed Communist system is the cause of the economic suffering of the Cubans, not the U.S. embargo.

## Bioterror

### 2nc no risk

#### Bioterror is a lie – terrorists don’t want bioweapons because they take forever and are expensive. Even under ideal scenarios attacks barely kill anyone – that’s Stratfor.

#### No impact to bioterror

Mueller 99, John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State and Karl Mueller, June, ’99 (Foreign Affairs, l/n)

Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly developed and deployed, they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical, however, because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though knowledge of their destructive potential goes back centuries. (The English, for example, made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians during the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason, because biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control. Although terrorist groups or rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through advances in knowledge and technology, the record thus far is not likely to encourage them. Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and had little military impact. In the 1990s the large and extremely well funded Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality -- in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. For best results biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of dispersion, moreover, may destroy the organisms. And except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could spread back onto the attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures.

#### There’s a low threshold for risk mitigation – we just have to win that terrorists would prefer convention means, not that they don’t want to attack at all.

Stratfor 8, (“Busting the Anthrax Myth,” July 30, <http://www.stratfor.com/print/120756>)

In fact, based on the past history of nonstate actors conducting attacks using biological weapons, we remain skeptical that a nonstate actor could conduct a biological weapons strike capable of creating as many casualties as a large strike using conventional explosives — such as the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths or the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191.

We do not disagree with Runge’s statements that actors such as al Qaeda have demonstrated an interest in biological weapons. There is ample evidence [4] that al Qaeda has a rudimentary biological weapons capability. However, there is a huge chasm of capability that separates intent and a rudimentary biological weapons program from a biological weapons program that is capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people.

Misconceptions About Biological Weapons

There are many misconceptions involving biological weapons. The three most common are that they are easy to obtain, that they are easy to deploy effectively, and that, when used, they always cause massive casualties.

While it is certainly true that there are many different types of actors who can easily gain access to rudimentary biological agents, there are far fewer actors who can actually isolate virulent strains of the agents, weaponize them and then effectively employ these agents in a manner that will realistically pose a significant threat of causing mass casualties. While organisms such as anthrax are present in the environment and are not difficult to obtain, more highly virulent strains of these tend to be far more difficult to locate, isolate and replicate. Such efforts require highly skilled individuals and sophisticated laboratory equipment.

Even incredibly deadly biological substances such as ricin [5] and botulinum toxin are difficult to use in mass attacks. This difficulty arises when one attempts to take a rudimentary biological substance and then convert it into a weaponized form — a form that is potent enough to be deadly and yet readily dispersed. Even if this weaponization hurdle can be overcome, once developed, the weaponized agent must then be integrated with a weapons system that can effectively take large quantities of the agent and evenly distribute it in lethal doses to the intended targets.

During the past several decades in the era of modern terrorism, biological weapons have been used very infrequently and with very little success. This fact alone serves to highlight the gap between the biological warfare misconceptions and reality. Militant groups desperately want to kill people and are constantly seeking new innovations that will allow them to kill larger numbers of people. Certainly if biological weapons were as easily obtained, as easily weaponized and as effective at producing mass casualties as commonly portrayed, militant groups would have used them far more frequently than they have.

Militant groups are generally adaptive and responsive to failure. If something works, they will use it. If it does not, they will seek more effective means of achieving their deadly goals. A good example of this was the rise and fall of the use of chlorine [6] in militant attacks in Iraq.

#### Status quo measures already neutralized the threat

Stratfor 8, (“Busting the Anthrax Myth,” July 30, <http://www.stratfor.com/print/120756>)

Aum Shinrikyo’s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. They were able to travel the world in search of deadly organisms and even received technical advice from former Soviet scientists. The team worked in large, modern laboratory facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. They were able to operate these facilities inside industrial parks and openly order the large quantities of laboratory equipment they required. Yet, in spite of the millions of dollars the group spent on its biological weapons program — and the lack of any meaningful interference from the Japanese government — Aum still experienced problems in creating virulent biological agents and also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively.

Today, al Qaeda finds itself operating in a very different environment than that experienced by Aum Shinrikyo in 1993. At that time, nobody was looking for Aum or its biological and chemical weapons program. By contrast, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States and its allies have actively pursued al Qaeda leaders and sought to dismantle and defang the organization. The United States and its allies have focused a considerable amount of resources in tracking and disassembling al Qaeda’s chemical and biological warfare efforts. The al Qaeda network has had millions of dollars of its assets seized in a number of countries, and it no longer has the safe haven of Afghanistan from which to operate. The chemical and biological facilities the group established in the 1990s in Afghanistan — such as the Deronta training camp, where cyanide and other toxins were used to kill dogs, and a crude anthrax production facility in Kandahar — have been found and destroyed by U.S. troops.

Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily build large modern factories capable of producing large quantities of agents or toxins. Such fixed facilities are expensive and consume a lot of resources. Even if al Qaeda had the spare capacity to invest in such facilities, the fixed nature of them means that they could be compromised and quickly destroyed by the United States.

If al Qaeda could somehow create and hide a fixed biological weapons facility in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas or North-West Frontier Province, it would still face the daunting task of transporting large quantities of biological agents from the Pakistani badlands to targets in the United States or Europe. Al Qaeda operatives certainly can create and transport small quantities of these compounds, but not enough to wreak the kind of massive damage it desires.

Al Qaeda’s lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed on July 28, 2008, by a U.S. missile strike on his home in Pakistan. Al-Sayid, who had a $5 million dollar bounty on his head, was initially reported to have been one of those killed in the January 2006 strike in Damadola [9]. If he was indeed killed, his death should be another significant blow to the group’s biological warfare efforts.

Of course, we must recognize that the jihadist threat goes just beyond the al Qaeda core. As we have been writing for several years now, al Qaeda has undergone a metamorphosis [10] from a smaller core group of professional operatives into an operational model that encourages independent grassroots jihadists to conduct attacks. The core al Qaeda group, through men like al-Sayid, has published manuals in hard copy and on the Internet that provide instructions on how to manufacture rudimentary biological weapons.

It is our belief that independent jihadist cells and lone-wolf jihadists will almost certainly attempt to brew up some of the recipes from the al Qaeda cookbook. There also exists a very real threat that a jihadist sympathizer could obtain a small quantity of deadly biological organisms by infiltrating a research facility.

This means that we likely will see some limited attempts at employing biological weapons. That does not mean, however, that such attacks will be large-scale or create mass casualties.

#### Empirics are the trump card

Easterbrook, senior editor – The New Republic, ‘3

(Gregg, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday_pr.html>)

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### Countermeasures contain the impact

Mueller 6, John Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Ohio State, 2006, Overblown p. 20-22

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even mil­lions of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: they are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but, notes scientist Russell Seitz, while bioterrorism may look easy on paper, ''the learning curve is lethally steep in practice." The record so far is unlikely to be very encouraging. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures (by a state, not a terrorist group) may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused considerable unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.20For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dis­persed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organ­isms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. And their impact is very diffi­cult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties—as an aerosol that can be inhaled—-requires a delivery system whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist." Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteoro­logical conditions.21 After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal pathogens effectively, biological weapons expert Milton Leiten-berg compares Ms conclusions with glib pronouncements in the press about how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and a few glass jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer." He sardonically concludes, ''The less the commenta­tor seems to know about biological warfare the easier he seems to think the task is."::

## Protectionism

### No risk

#### Protectionism is impossible – WTO firewalls prevent rapid adoption of large tariffs – that’s Ahearn

#### No impact on trade

Hiau Looi **Kee et al 11**, development research group at the World Bank, “Is Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies during the Crisis of 2008”, January 29, <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/pdf/2011/25260511/kee-neagu-nicita.pdf>

Going through the schedules of all countries in our dataset, we found that, overall, there has been no widespread increase in tariffs. While there are many countries that have increased tari¤s on imported products, the trade impact has generally been minimal. However, for a handful of countries, tari¤ increases on important items in both agriculture and manufacturing pushed up their OTRI and signi…cantly a¤ected trade. Russia, Malawi and Argentina all increased tari¤s on manufacturing products which caused their OTRI to increase by 0.9 to 1.2 percentage points and their trade ‡ows to drop by US$4.8 billion, US$29 million and US$914 million, respectively. Turkey on the other hand increased tari¤s on a wide range of agricultural products, which raised its OTRI by 0.8 percentage points and caused its trade ‡ow to decrease by US$2.2 billion. With the removal of a temporary tari¤ reduction on palm oil and the introduction of some anti-dumping duties, India had a large increase in the level of protectionism of agriculture products (8.3 percentage points), even though this was o¤set by tari¤ liberalization in the manufacturing sector such that India’s OTRI increased only by 0.1 percentage points. Other countries that had large drops in trade due to increases in tari¤s include China (US$5 billion), Canada (US$1.8 billion) and Brazil (US$991 million). Finally, for the US and the EU, while the tari¤ schedules remained roughly the same throughout our period of analysis, spikes in anti-dumping duties caused their OTRI to increase by 0.5 percentage points and 0.1 percentage points respectively. Jointly, if we add up all the decrease in trade for all countries during the crisis period due to changes in tari¤s and anti-dumping duties, in the worst case scenario, the total decrease in imports is about US$43 billion, which is less than half a percent of world’s imports in 2008. According to the latest estimate of the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2010), the world’s import decreased by 24% from its pre-crisis level. Thus, trade policies can explain at most 2 percent of the sharp drop in world trade. This suggests that protectionism was not the main culprit behind the collapse of world trade and the collapse of world trade did not cause protectionism to increase.

#### Timeframe is decades

**IINS 10**, India Infoline News Service, “Large-scale trade protectionism unlikely”, June 30, <http://www.indiainfoline.com/Markets/News/Large-scale-trade-protectionism-unlikely/4872197176>

The world economy has changed structurally in the past few decades, making any serious implementation of protectionist measures almost impossible. Developed countries are more dependent on imports of manufactured goods and services than they have ever been. Most developed countries have oriented their domestic production capacities towards high-end products. Their domestic capacities for manufacturing low-end products are modest at best, so it will not be easy for them to launch a full-scale protectionist war. Setting up large production capacities to replace imports would take years if not decades. Besides, raising import tariffs across-the-board will certainly raise prices for domestic consumers manifold.

#### Trade agreements and self-interest solve

Hiau Looi **Kee et al 11**, development research group at the World Bank, “Is Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies during the Crisis of 2008”, January 29, <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/pdf/2011/25260511/kee-neagu-nicita.pdf>

There are several reasons why countries have been so restrained in terms of raising their tari¤s and AD. First, most countries are part of bilateral, regional or multilateral trade agreements which may have significantly restricted their ability to adjust tariffs during the crisis period. The limitations in policy space due to multilateral obligations are more relevant for developed countries, such as the EU and the US, where the di¤erence between bound and applied rates is generally small. This is not the case for most developing countries. Those are generally more constrained by obligations within regional and preferential trade agreements. Second, countries may recognize the adverse long run impact of those protectionist policies in the context of an increasingly globalized economy. This is particularly the case if the exports of the countries depend heavily on imported materials: higher tari¤s will severely a¤ect exports thus further hindering economic recovery. Similarly, global production chains and foreign direct investment (FDI) that span across national borders have made it harder to distinguish domestic from foreign. Thus, many multinational …rms …nd that traditional forms of protectionism are contrary to their interests. This could explain why most countries continued to liberalize their tari¤ policies during the crisis rather than raising tari¤s. In this regard, carefully targeted AD may well be the more suitable policy choice. However, the modest increase in AD cases during the crisis suggests that …rms may also have found this instrument inadequate to protect their interests.

#### Leaders won’t cave to pressure

Ng **Baoying 9**, Channel NewsAsia, “Mounting pressure on governments to support local economy, but protectionism unlikely”, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporebusinessnews/view/421521/1/.html>

As the world deals with a global recession, there are concerns that some countries will turn to protectionist measures to shield their domestic economies. But observers have said that so far, most governments remain committed to free trade and that global trade flows are not likely to suffer for now. China exports cheap toys to many parts of the world. And should countries restrict imports on its toys, experts said China can easily retaliate. For example, it can block hard disk drives from Thailand, which are sent to China for assembly into computers. And this could lead to a downward spiral. But analysts said this is unlikely, as supply chains are extremely interlinked on a global scale. David Cohen, Director of Asian Economic Forecasting, Action Economics, said: "The fact that at these international gatherings they still feel obliged to include a statement opposing broad protectionism in their communique from their summits, that should help allow them to resist any domestic pressure for further protectionism. "In the current environment, I think the leaders are aware that they would only make things worse if they were to start adopting increases in tariffs; that would choke off world trade more than it has fallen off in the global downturn. "I think they do realise that when people look back (to) the 1930s, they identify the protectionist tariffs as having aggravated the downturn, and I think the leaders are intent that they are not going to go down that route again."

# 1NR

All cards read are in open source Round 6